In this nal lecture I will be sketching some redevelopments of classical analysis on both constructive and predicative grounds, with an emphasis on modern approaches. In the case of constructivity, I h a ve v ery little to say about Brouwerian intuitionism, which has been discussed extensively in other lectures at this conference, and concentrate instead on the approach since 1967 of Errett Bishop and his school. In the case of predicativity, I concentrate on developments|also since the 1960s|which take up where Weyl's work left o , as described in my second lecture. In both cases, I rst look at these redevelopments from a more informal, mathematical, point This is the last of my three lectures for the conference, Proof Theory: History and Philosophical Signi cance, held at the University of Roskilde, Denmark, Oct. 31{Nov. 1, 1997 . See the footnote * to the rst lecture, \Highlights in Proof Theory" for my acknowledgements.
of view (Part I) and then from a formal, metamathematical point o f v i e w (Part II), with each part devoted rst to the constructive and then to the predicative redevelopments.
I Informal Mathematical Part
A. Constructive r e d e v elopments of mathematics. In Brouwerian intuitionism the real numbers are treated in some way or another as Cauchy sequences of rationals, understood as (free-) choice sequences. Brouwer's idea concerning these seems to be that one has only a nite amount of information about such sequences at any g i v en time. That was a kind of argument f o r the continuity conclusion, namely, t h a t a n y constructive function of choicesequences must be continuous. Even more:
Brouwer's Theorem. E v ery function on a closed interval a b] i s uniformly continuous.
This, on the face of it, is in direct contradiction to classical mathematics, but once it is understood that Brouwer's theorem must be explained di erently via the intuitionistic interpretation of the notions involved, an actual contradiction is avoided. Perhaps if di erent terminology had been used, classical mathematicians would not have found the intuitionistic redevelopment of analysis so o -putting, if not downright puzzling.
In contrast, the Bishop style constructive d e v elopment of mathematics, which I abbreviate BCM|for Bishop Constructive Mathematics, can be read as a part of classical analysis, though developed in more re ned terms. This was put on the map by Errett Bishop in 1967 with the publication of his book, Foundations of Constructive Analysis (Bishop 1967) . Bishop had been working in classical analysis and had made important contributions to that subject over a long period of time. But then he had some radical change of views about classical analysis and felt that it had to be redeveloped on entirely constructive grounds. In a moment I will explain features of his position, as it relates to earlier approaches to constructive analysis. Douglas Bridges joined Bishop in the preparation of a second edition of his book, when Bishop decided that some parts needed reworking, especially the theory of measure. Bridges had published a book on constructive functional analysis in the 1970s (Bridges 1979) , and was eminently suited to help in this way. Unfortunately Bishop died of leukemia before the second edition (Bishop and Bridges 1985) appeared, but Bridges was pretty faithful to Bishop's original conception in completing the work. Besides these works in constructive analysis, a substantial amount o f classical algebra has been redeveloped in the Bishop style approach the main reference there is A Course in Constructive Algebra (Mines, Richman and Ruitenberg 1988) .
Bishop criticized both non-constructive classical mathematics and intuitionism. He called non-constructive mathematics a \scandal", particularly because of its \de ciency in numerical meaning". What he simply meant was that if you say something exists you ought to be able to produce it, and if you say there is a function which does something on the natural numbers then you ought to be able to produce a machine which calculates it out at each n umber. His criticism of intuitionism was its failure, simply, t o c o n vince mathematicians that there is a workable alternative to classical mathematics which p r o vides this kind of numerical information (though intuitionistic reasoning also provides that in principle).
General style of BCM. Since, as I said, Bishop's redevelopment o f a n a lysis is part of classical analysis, several re nements of classical notions had to be made in order to give it constructive content (or \numerical meaning"). Bishop explained in general terms how t h i s w as to be done, using the following dicta.
First of all, use only \a rmative" or \positive" concepts. For example, the inequality relation between real numbers is rede ned to mean that you have a rational witness which separates the two n umbers by being greater than one and less than the other.
Second, avoid \irrelevant" de nitions. For example, the idea of an arbitrary function of real numbers is irrelevant for Bishop because there is nothing useful you can do with it. Instead, he begins by dealing with a very special class of functions of real numbers, namely those which are uniformly continuous on very compact interva l . I n t h i s w ay, he nesses the whole issue of how one arrives at Brouwer's theorem by s a ying that those are the only functions, at least initially, that one is going to talk about. (So, the question is: if you just talk about those kinds of functions, are you going to be able to do a lot of interesting mathematics? That is, in fact, the case!)
Third, avoid \pseudo-generality". An example of avoiding \pseudo-generality" is that Bishop never works on non-separable spaces. Every space he works with is separable|that is, has a countable dense subset. One has the same restriction in predicative mathematics, but Bishop uses it in a special way.
Bishop's language of sets and functions is very close to everyday mathematical language. He does not use the concept of \choice sequence". A sequence, for Bishop, is a sequence, a set is a set, and a function is a function, though in each case with some added structure or constraints. Foundations of real analysis in BCM, compared to classical analysis. Classically a Cauchy sequence is simply a sequence hx n i n of rational numbers x n (n 2 N) such that for any degree of accuracy, 1 =p + 1 , w h e r e p is a natural number, you can get within that by going su ciently far out in the Cauchy sequence, i.e. such t h a t 8p 9k 8n m k jx n ; x m j < 1 p + 1 : Now, for Bishop, a Cauchy sequence is one where you tell how f a r o u t i n the sequence, hx n i n , y ou have to go in order to get within degree of accuracy, 1=p + 1 . T h a t i s g i v en by a function K(p) satisfying 8p 8n m K(p) jx n ; x m j < 1 p + 1 :
K is called a modulus-of-convergence-function for that sequence. (This is a mild modi cation of the way Bishop does it. 1 ) N o w t h e s e t R of real numbers in BCM is not de ned as the set of Cauchy sequences, but rather as the set of pairs (hx n i n K ) where x n 2 Q and K is an associated modulus-of-convergence-function. It is those pairs that you operate on when you are working with real numbers. You have t o have explicit information about how f a r y ou need to go out in the sequence in order to be within 1=p + 1 of the answer.
Equality, = R , o f r e a l n umbers is de ned as usual, which means that two real numbers (hx n i n K ) and (hy n i n L ) are equal if they have the same limit.
But we do not take the real numbers in the classical way t o b e e q u i v alence classes of Cauchy sequences. What we h a ve to do instead is be sure that when we are dealing with a function on R as de ned above, it preserves = R .
One next has straightforward de nitions of addition, subtraction, multiplication and absolute value of real numbers. For example, (hx n i K ) + R (hy n i L ) = ( hx n + y n i n M ) where M(p) = m a x ( K (2p + 1 ) L (2p + 1)). To compute M for the case of division, (hx n i K ) R (hy n i L ), one must explicitly incorporate a bit of information q that shows the limit of the jy n js to be at least 1=q + 1 (where q 2 N).
Bishop makes systematic use of sets A with an equivalence relation = A on them, rather than the corresponding sets of equivalence classes, and also of functions preserving the equivalence relations rather than functions on the equivalence classes. In that way y ou can truly talk about numerical or computational implementation of his notions. For example, a computational implementation of a function on real numbers will take f o r e a c h argument a sequence of rationals which i s g i v en computationally, and a function K that is given computationally, with both given by algorithms as data for which we compute the value of the function, represented by certain output data. We might h a ve a di erent presentation of that same real number and we will get a computation which gives a di erent a n s w er in the way i t i s r e p r e s e n ted but which has to be equal to it in the sense of equality on the real numbers.
Taking the de nition of real numbers to be modi ed in this way, y ou end up with a constructive v ersion of the real number system. For instance, a form of the Cauchy Completeness Theorem holds: every Cauchy sequence 1 He takes these to be sequences hx n i n such that 8n m 1 jx n ; x m j < 1 n + 1 m , s o that K(p) = 2 ( p + 1 ) w orks in this case.
of reals with a modulus-of-convergence function will converge to a real in Bishop' This is generalized to more abstract classes of spaces. To begin with, Bishop works with separable metric spaces, and he de nes compactness for these in a very particular way a s f o l l o ws. A metric space is called totally bounded if for every " i t c a n b e c o vered by a n i t e n umberof "-neighborhoods. That means that given any " you can nd a nite set of points x 1 : : : x n such that any p o i n t of the space is within a distance less than " of one of these points, i.e. you have a function of " which actually produces the required points. Then a separable metric space is de ned to be compact if it is totally bounded and every Cauchy sequence (in his sense) converges. Finally, the function spaces C(X Y) are de ned whenever X is compact in this sense and Y is a separable metric space. Again that is the class of uniformly continuous functions f : X ! Y with a uniform-modulus-of-continuity function given as witnessing information.
On the basis of this kind of systematic re nement of classical concepts, the BCM school redevelops substantial tracts of 19th and 20th century analysis and algebra constructively. T o be fully convinced of that you just have t o go through the expositions referred to above to see for yourself. It is an impressive b o d y o f w ork, and it is not o -putting to the working (classical) mathematician in the way that Brouwerian intuitionism was. If you are willing to be interested in the development at all as a mathematician, you can read it, and you can take in what all these concepts are. It does not con ict with your ordinary mathematical feelings about what these notions are, and once you get the style of using witnessing information systematically, y ou see how i t g o e s a n d y ou get a feeling for why it is constructive. Moreover LPO^ ! In that sense too, BCM is just a re nement of classical mathematics, a re nement w h i c h i n a n i n tuitive sense has constructive c o n tent. What that comes to from a logical point of view will be taken up in Part IIA below. Before that, we turn next to comparisons with the predicative program.
B. Predicative redevelopments of classical mathematics. Although a great deal of work has been done since the 1960s as a continuation of Weyl's program there are, unfortunately, no texts one can point to for a systematic exposition, at least none comparable to those referred to above f o r BCM.
One book that people mention in this respect is Paul Lorenzen's Di erential und Integral (Lorenzen 1965) while signi cant portions of that are based on predicative grounds, it is not restricted to such. The monograph of Gaisi Takeuti, Two Applications of Logic to Mathematics (Takeuti 1978 ) is, on the other hand, clearly predicative that presents a nite-type extension of the system ACA 0 (de ned in my second lecture), and shows how v arious parts of classical analysis can be formalized there. For predicative developments of classical and modern analysis, one can point to substantial portions of Stephen Simpson's book, Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic (Simpson 1998 ) see especially Chs. III and IV. I shall be concentrating in the following, instead, on my o wn approach which has been outlined in several articles (references below) and elaborated in unpublished notes.
Before going into that, a brief comparison with the work in the Reverse Mathematics program established by H a r v ey Friedman and carried on by Steve Simpson and his students, is in order that is what (Simpson 1998 ) is devoted to. In the Reverse Mathematics program one studies certain second order formal systems, such a s ACA 0 , where you have v ariables for natural numbers and variables for sets of natural numbers, or for functions of natural numbers. (Concepts of analysis such as real numbers are naturally represented at the second-order level, but things become a bit more awkward as soon as one ascends to various kinds of sets and functions of real numbers and function spaces used in analysis.) It is shown in the Reverse Mathematics program that there are ve basic set existence principles from which many results of classical and modern analysis, topology, and algebra follow. It happens that many of these results are equivalent to the basic set existence principles from which they follow, i.e. the implications can be reversed, a n d that is the main concern in Reverse Mathematics.
By comparison, my o wn main interest is in consequences rather than equivalences, a n d m y concern is to have formal systems justi ed on basic grounds of one kind or another, in which the mathematics in question can be developed in as direct a way as possible this generally means going beyond second-order systems. In particular, I have d e v eloped such systems in which you can redevelop substantial portions of classical and modern analysis on predicatively justi ed grounds. One such is a system I call W, i n h o n o r o f Weyl, which is in a certain sense a variable nite type extension of ACA 0 .
I will describe that later in the nal logical part of this article.
In W you can decide, in a sense that I will describe, questions of the form: 9nf(n) = 0 in other words the Limit Principle of Omniscience, LPO, holds. Moreover, all the work of (Bishop and Bridges 1985) can be directly represented within W. Recall that for each classical theorem considered in the Bishop and Bridges text, a constructive substitute is found such that ^LPO implies . S o y ou could say: let us put these two together. We g o to their book, see all the theorems that they get, add LPO, which i s i n W, and thus obtain the classical theorem in W. There is of course an immediate conviction about how m uch can be done in this way, b u t w e might l i k e t o see|without going through this detour which i n volves additional complexity of various kinds|just what can be done directly in W. S o w e start again: how d o w e treat the real numbers, how d o w e treat functions of real numbers, and so on through the whole business. As I said in Lecture 2, the way W eyl presented the real numbers was via Dedekind sections. But it is actually more convenient t o w ork with Cauchy sequences. Unlike the approach i n BCM where a modulus-of-convergence function is part of what constitutes a Cauchy sequence, in the system W, these are de ned just as they are classically. That follows from the fact that the formula 8n m k jx n ; x m j < 1 p + 1 is arithmetical, hence it can be decided by LPO, and the least such k can be determined without building it in as additional information. Thus, I do not have t o c hange the de nition of Cauchy sequence from its classical de nition.
Among the theorems that you can prove i n W are the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem saying that the real numbers are locally sequentially compact. In particular it follows that R is Cauchy complete, because any C a u c hy sequence is bounded, therefore it has a convergent subsequence and therefore it must converge. However, we c a n n o t p r o ve the LUB axiom for sets in W, for the same reason, basically, t h a t i t i s n o t p r o vable in ACA 0 .
The argument for the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem is by subdivision: if we h a ve an in nite sequence in the interval a b] then divide this interval in half and ask if there are in nitely many terms of the sequence which l i e i n the left-hand half if there are, we are then going to continue on that lefthand half if not, then there must be in nitely many terms on the right-hand half and we will work on the right-hand side. Whichever half we c hoose, we divide it again, and ask which half has in nitely many, and so on. But the question whether \there are in nitely many ' s " i s o f t h e f o r m
That is an arithmetical formula when is arithmetical and it is then a question which is decided by LPO. Hence, the subdivision argument proceeds in W as it does classically. Beyond R, a s i n BCM, w e w ork within separable metric spaces, where again a countable sub-basis is explicitly given. One then veri es that many familiar spaces such as nite dimensional real and complex spaces, as well as Baire space, are locally sequentially compact. One of the consequences for such spaces is the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem, w h i c h tells us that arbitrary continuous functions can be approximated in a very nice way. It was not obvious how to do measure theory in Weyl's setup. Standard classical presentations of measure theory start out with the de nition of measure of a measurable subset, say, o f a n i t e i n terval, via the de nition of outer measure. Now, outer measure looks at the shrinking of open covers of the given set and takes the greatest lower bound of the measures of those open sets. We can de ne measures of open sets of reals very nicely because they decompose into a countable union of disjoint o p e n i n tervals. But for outer measure we m ust then apply the GLB axiom, which is not provable in W. Instead, measurable sets are there taken to be ones that are well approximated, both themselves and their complements, by sequences of open covers. You simply use the approximations from both sides in order to deal with measurable sets directly without going through outer measure. It turns out in this development that we cannot prove the existence of non-measurable sets. It is consistent w i t h W that all sets of real numbers are measurable, but we do not assume that. What can be done in W is a kind of \positive" development of measure theory.
Following that, one develops the theory of Lebesgue integration, measurable functions, and Lebesgue integrable functions and proceeds into functional analysis in a fairly standard way. One can deal in W with linear operators on separable Banach and Hilbert spaces and carry out the spectral theory of bounded operators. All of this has been worked out by m e in unpublished notes. One further thing I started to wo r k o n w as how t o do the spectral theory of unbounded operators. One way of doing that is to approximate unbounded operators by bounded operators in a systematic way, and that looked like it should go through. 2 As a result of such w ork, I proposed in (Feferman 1988 (Feferman , 1993 A. Formal systems for BCM. I shall concentrate on two papers of my own, A language and axioms for explicit mathematics (Feferman 1975 ) which covers both constructive and predicative mathematics and, more speci cally for constructive mathematics, Constructive theories of functions and classes (Feferman 1988) . But let me refer you also to a few other approaches to formal systems for BCM, including: H. Friedman, Set-theoretic foundations for constructive analysis (Friedman 1977) , and P. Martin-L of, Intuitionistic Type T h e ory (Martin-L of 1984). As to the latter, Martin-L of came to his concepts of intuitionistic type theory on more or less philosophical grounds he was not motivated by the question whether you could formalize BCM in it, and I do not think he was particularly concerned about that. But people have said that it is in fact one way i n w h i c h y ou can look at BCM and represent it formally. A lot of information can be found in the book by M i c hael Beeson, Foundations of Constructive Mathematics (Beeson 1985) comparing di erent formal approaches, including the ones that I have m e n tioned. A v ery good further source, the two v olumes by A . S . T roelstra and D. van Dalen, Constructivism in Mathematics I, II, (Troelstra and van Dalen 1988) also presents various di erent approaches. Naturally, I f a vor my o wn, and I will sketch that now. What I did in (Feferman 1975) was to introduce some formal systems of \Explicit Mathematics", to begin with, a theory T 0 which is constructive i n a suitable sense of the word, and then an extension T 1 which incorporates predicative systems. The paper (Feferman 1979) elaborates on the uses of T 0 and its metamathematical properties. We c o n c e i v e its universe of discourse, V to be rather rich: it includes the natural numbers, is closed under pairing, and includes elements which are regarded as partial functions. Then partial functions can apply to natural numbers or n-tuples of natural numbers or ntuples of other objects of the universe, and they can also apply to themselves. But then you have the possibility of functionals, because functions applied to functions are simply functionals. There are some basic axioms which govern how these work, the Applicative Axioms, APP, which are essentially like the axioms for Lambda Calculus, but modi ed to a form where we are dealing, not with total functions, but with partial functions. So it is a Partial Applicative Lambda Calculus. There is a range of models M of APP from the recursive to the set-theoretical. In the former case, V is taken to be the natural numbers and functions are taken to be (codes for) partial recursive functions. In the latter case, V is taken to be the cumulative hierarchy a n d functions are generated from ordinary set-theoretic functions to satisfy APP. Every model M of APP can be expanded to a model of the remaining axioms of T 0 , all of which concern classes. We deal with classes either regarded as elements of V in an intensional way or as represented by elements of V . In the latter case they are named by elements o f V , s o w e can operate constructively on the names, and we may regard the classes themselves as extensional objects. There is a choice there, but it is an inessential di erence, it is just a formal di erence whether you take them at the outset as intensional objects, that is as predicates, or as extensional objects represented in possibly di erent w ays. For these you have a n Elementary Comprehension Axiom (ECA) w h i c h is elementary in the sense that you do not have q u a n ti ers ranging over classes in the statement of which classes are asserted to exist, only over the elements of the universe, V . But since V is very rich y ou may h a ve q u a n ti cation not only over numbers but also over partial functions in ECA.
Examples of constructions of classes which follow from ECA are: X Y , X n and X ! Y (the class of all functions which are total on X to Y .) In ad-dition to APP and ECA, the system T 0 further contains: usual axioms for the class of natural numbers N, including the full induction scheme inductively generated classes in general (IG), and a Join Axiom ( among others. It turns out that it is su cient i n J to posit the disjoint union construction P x2A B x , from which the others are constructed by ECA. All of BCM may be comfortably formalized in T 0 . But that system is proof-theoretically very strong, and goes far beyond what is needed to do so. For that purpose, I introduced a relatively (proof-theoretically) weak subsystem EM 0 of T 0 in the 1979 paper referenced above. It omits the J and IG axioms, and restricts the induction scheme for N to classes, as in ACA 0 that is called Restricted Induction, as is indicated by the sign . ( EM' is just an acronym for`Explicit Mathematics'.) Though the join operation is not available in this system, the above operations on sequences of classes hB x i x2A can still be carried out for \pre-joined" families, i.e. for which the class f(x y) j y 2 B x g is given in advance.
These systems are presented within the classical two sorted predicate calculus, but, if we w ant to, we can certainly consider intuitionistic versions by omitting the Law of the Excluded Middle then we put an i to indicate that: T i 0 , ( EM 0 ) i :
The main meta-theorems obtained for EM 0 , are rst of all that in classical logic the system is a conservative extension of Peano Arithmetic, PA I showed that by a simple model-theoretic argument. Then for intuitionistic logic, Beeson showed by using instead, that (EM 0 where would full induction on N and the use of non-pre-joined families and general inductively generated classes come in to the picture? These last are used in T 0 for a constructive theory of ordinals as constructive tree-classes. Now in the original version of Bishop's book, he did measure theory by using Borel classes, and Borel classes in e ect require using ordinals. But, later, he was able to avoid the use of Borel classes by a quite di erent approach he worked out with a student of his (H. Cheng), and that is what you nd in Bishop and Bridges' book. It replaces the theory of Borel classes and therefore does not use ordinals, and thus does not require IG.
By contrast, in Bishop style constructive algebra there is a part of Abelian group theory where ordinals do come into the picture in an essential way, namely in what is called the Ulm theory of countable Abelian groups, and that de nitely cannot be represented in (EM 0 ) i (though it can be in T 0 ).
But ordinary nitely generated Abelian group theory all goes through without the use of ordinals. Aside from that, coming back to possible uses of full induction on N and full Join axiom in (Bishop and Bridges 1985) , one just has to examine these case by case. By being sensitive to that question and looking at various test cases you can see that all of BCM that does not use ordinals can in fact be formalized in (EM 0 ) i and therefore rests on a basis that does not assume any more than Heyting arithmetic.
B. Formal systems for predicativity. To conclude, let us look at the metamathematical picture for predicativity. Here there are quite a few references going back to the mid-60s, beginning with the work of myself (Feferman 1964) and K. Sch utte (1965) on the analysis of the full extent o f predicative mathematics. For further references, see (Feferman 1987) and J ager 1993, 1996) .
To g o b a c k to the work of Sch utte and myself from 1964, what this dealt with was Kreisel's proposal to characterize what is predicative via trans nite rami ed analysis. Although that is not a suitable foundation for the actual predicative d e v elopment of analysis, conceptually it is the appropriate place to look at predicativity, though not through arbitrary ordinals, which w ould not make sense predicatively. Only those ordinals which one can access step by step from below b y a kind of autonomy or bootstrap condition are to be considered. What Sch utte and I achieved independently in 1964 was a determination of the least ordinal that is not obtainable in this way. And that ordinal is the limit ; 0 of the Veblen hierarchy of critical functions described in Lecture 1. The union of systems of rami ed analysis up to but not including ; 0 is denoted RA <; 0 . Now i f y ou want to see what part of analysis can actually be carried out on predicative grounds, one needs subsystems which are predicatively justi ed, but which are not rami ed. And by predicative justi cation of a system is meant a proof theoretic reduction to RA <; 0 . For example, ACA 0 is predicatively justi ed in this sense, since it can be interpreted in RA 0 , rami ed analysis at the lowest level. The system W discussed informally in Part IB is a candidate for a more exible predicatively justi ed system which is also unrami ed. To spell out its principles, rst of all W is contained in the system T 1 of (Feferman 1975) . One axiom of W says explicitly that existential quanti cation over natural numbers is something that is decided by a functional , a s f o l l o ws:
Here we can think of (f) as the least n such t h a t f(n) = 0, if there is such an n, otherwise it takes the value 0, and so is called the non-constructive minimum operator. As in the system EM 0 , w e m a k e use of a restricted form of induction on N. There it was restricted to classes, while in W we h a ve a still more restricted form called function induction. I t s a ys that if a function f at 0 is 0 and if the property f(x) = 0 is closed under successor, then f is 0 at all natural numbers:
Equivalently: if two functions agree at 0 and whenever they agree at x they agree at its successor then they agree on all natural numbers. With these modi cations, the system W is very similar to EM 0 . It has the Applicative Axioms, but now beefed up with the functional, . It has the basic axioms for 0 and of successor on the natural numbers (N-Axioms) as before, but in place of Class Induction it has Function Induction nally it has Elementary Comprehension Axiom, as before. Symbolically, W = APP + ( ) + N-Axs + ( Fun-Ind N ) + ECA : The main metamathematical result for W is due to J ager and myself J ager 1993, 1996) we s h o w ( b y a m uch more di cult argument than for EM 0 ) t h a t W is a conservative extension of PA. Hence, it also is predicatively reducible.
From our metatheorem and the working hypothesis that all (or almost all ) scienti cally applicable analysis can be carried out in W it follows that the part of mathematics needed for science rests on completely arithmetical grounds. The signi cance of this is discussed further, in the conclusion below.
It is natural to ask whether still weaker systems (proof-theoretically) serve the same purpose. That has been established to an extent i n R e v erse Mathematics. There, as mentioned before, only second order systems are used among these, one second order system emerges that comes up when we are dealing with the subdivision argument. It is based on the so-called Weak K onig's Lemma, WKL. F ull KL concerns arbitrary nitely branching trees, where WKL simply deals with binary branching trees. Both say, classically, that if there are no in nite branches then there is a common nite bound on the length of all the branches, or equivalently, if there are arbitrarily long branches then there is an in nite branch. The system WKL 0 treated in Reverse Mathematics is obtained from ACA 0 by restricting the set existence axiom ACA to recursive predicates and adding the statement WKL. I t w as shown by F riedman by a model-theoretic argument and then by Sieg ( 1991) by a proof-theoretical argument using Herbrand-Gentzen style methods, that WKL 0 is a conservative extension of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, PRA. The system PRA is a fragment o f PA that is purely quanti er-free and simply has the usual de ning axioms for primitive recursive functions and a q u a n ti er-free rule of induction. It has been argued by T ait that PRA represents exactly nitistic mathematics. Though what nitism consists in is not a settled matter, Tait's thesis is generally granted.
So now the questions is, how m uch of classical and modern analysis can already be carried out in WKL 0 ? Simpson and his students have gone through this and shown that, not only the analysis of step-wise continuous functions can be done there, but also substantial portions of functional analysis can be handled there as well. (Cf. (Simpson 1998) , Ch. IV for a detailed exposition and further references). Since, in my view, exible (variable) nite type systems are preferable to second order systems when examining such questions, let us go back t o the system W. T h e o b vious conjecture is that if we replace the ( )-axiom by its consequence WKL in the system W, w e then obtain a conservative extension of PRA. That would give a system in which substantial portions of scienti cally applicable analysis can be formalized and which can, in principle, be justi ed on nitistic grounds. (The argument t h a t J ager and I gave for W does not pull down directly to this subsystem of W. So, the matter h a s t o b e l o o k ed at again.)
To conclude, in (Feferman 1993 ) I have discussed the signi cance of my working hypothesis concerning scienti cally applicable mathematics in W| which a s w e h a ve seen is a conservative extension of PA|for the so-called Quine-Putnam indispensability arguments. Their thesis was, as summarized by P enelope Maddy (cf. op. cit. for the source): \We h a ve good reason to believe our best scienti c theories, and mathematical entities are indispensable to those theories, so we h a ve good reason to believe in mathematical entities. Mathematics is thus on a . . . par with natural science and] the evidence that con rms scienti c theories also con rms the required mathematics." Quine argued that this justi es Zermelo set theory, Z, but not Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF. The reasoning was that we need the Axiom of In nity t o o b t a i n the natural numbers N and then the Power Set Axiom to obtain the real numbers R, and its application once more to obtain the set of real functions R ! R according to Quine, one is led to accept something like Zermelo set theory Z by a \simpli catory rounding out," though no more is necessary for actual science. But Z is both highly impredicative a n d v astly stronger than even full second order analysis, which in turn is impredicative a n d v astly stronger than the kinds of systems such a s W we h a ve been dealing with here. Quine's acceptance of Z is based on an uncritical examination of what is actually needed in mathematics for natural science. The work described here shows that, as least as far as currently applicable mathematics is concerned, we do not need to go beyond systems of strength PA. I , m yself, do not accept the indispensability arguments but think it is philosophically important t o b e a ware of that result if one accepts them at all. This concludes my tour of those modern approaches to constructive a n d predicative mathematics, and of associated formal systems, with which I a m most closely acquainted. Whatever approach one prefers (and the references below can be pursued for other such), I hope you are convinced by t h e w ork presented here of both the viability of constructive and predicative alternatives to classical mathematics (at least of its scienti cally applicable part) as well as of my slogan that \a little bit goes a long way".
